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Abstract
It is generally agreed that slack has some impact on in￿ ation. There is much less agreement on what
form the relationship takes and whether it is stable enough to reliably help predict in￿ ation. This analysis
focuses on the Great Moderation period. We ￿nd that slack (as measured by the unemployment rate) and
changes in slack are negatively correlated with changes in in￿ ation and also deviations of in￿ ation from
long-forward in￿ ation expectations. These relationships could have been exploited to produce forecasts of
trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation more accurate than rule-of-thumb forecasts. Forecasts of trimmed mean PCE
in￿ ation also serve well as predictions of GDP in￿ ation and headline PCE in￿ ation. Our analysis suggests
that currently high levels of slack should hold in￿ ation below two percent over 2012.
JEL codes: E31, E37
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A
s of this writing (November 2011), the four-quarter headline PCE in￿ ation rate is 2.9 percent, up sharply
from 1.5 percent four quarters earlier. Does the increase signal the beginning of a potentially dangerous
upward trend? Alternatively, is it likely to be reversed in coming quarters? Advocates of the latter view cite
persistent real resource slack in the economy. The unemployment rate, for example, averaged 9.1 percent in
third quarter 2011￿ over 3 percentage points above its long-run (20-year) average and down only modestly
from the 9.6-percent rate recorded a year earlier. In this paper, we examine whether slack or changes in
slack are systematically related to in￿ ation and, more pertinently, whether slack or changes in slack are
useful for predicting in￿ ation.
The relationship between slack and in￿ ation has long been a topic of interest to economists, of course.
The original Phillips curve was a negative empirical relationship between the unemployment rate and (wage)
in￿ ation. When this relationship proved to be unstable, economists shifted to thinking of slack as impacting
in￿ ation measured relative to some baseline in￿ ation rate. The baseline might be lagged in￿ ation, for
example, in which case an unemployment below normal would be associated with rising in￿ ation, rather
than with a high constant level of in￿ ation. This paper starts by reviewing the empirical implications
of several theoretical in￿ ation models. Then it looks for an empirical relationship between the change in
in￿ ation and lagged slack, and between the deviation of in￿ ation from trend in￿ ation and lagged slack. The
sample used runs from ￿rst quarter 1984 to ￿rst quarter 2011. It is dominated by the Great Moderation￿ a
period of generally low and stable in￿ ation during which naive forecasts are known to perform well. The
￿nal section undertakes a forecasting exercise that uses only data that would have been available when each
forecast was prepared.
Our main conclusions are as follows. First, we ￿nd that slack does matter for in￿ ation. However,
discerning slack￿ s e⁄ects is sometimes di¢ cult because they can be obscured by quarter-to-quarter in￿ ation
￿ uctuations that are driven by other factors. Trimmed mean in￿ ation measures remove many of these
transitory in￿ uences, allowing the e⁄ects of slack to come to the fore. Second, while slack is an important
in￿ uence on in￿ ation, it is not the only important in￿ uence. Expected future monetary policy, as re￿ ected
in the public￿ s perception of the Fed￿ s long-term in￿ ation objective, also has immediate and direct in￿ ation
e⁄ects. Expected future monetary policy determines the long-term trend in in￿ ation, while slack and
changes in slack help explain near-term deviations away from that trend. Third, even if it is the stability of
headline in￿ ation that ultimately matters to policymakers, adjusting policy in response to realized headline
in￿ ation is a mug￿ s game. Because headline in￿ ation has a large transitory component, reacting to it is
like chasing a will-o￿ -the-wisp: You￿ ll end up where you don￿ t want to go. It￿ s better to react to forecasted
headline in￿ ation or to trimmed mean in￿ ation. Finally, forecasts of headline and trimmed mean in￿ ation
are essentially identical at the horizons relevant for policy. Indeed, forecasting equations ￿tted to trimmed
mean in￿ ation do a better job of predicting headline in￿ ation than forecasting equations ￿tted directly to
headline in￿ ation. Intuitively, because noise is stripped away from the regression, forecasting equations
￿tted using trimmed mean in￿ ation have more precise coe¢ cient estimates than those ￿tted with headline
in￿ ation.
1. INFLATION MODELS
There is fairly general agreement that slack ought to matter for in￿ ation: In￿ ation should tend to be
low or to decrease when slack is high, once one controls appropriately for other in￿ uences. The question is,
￿Be low or decrease relative to what?￿That is, ￿What is the appropriate baseline against which to compare
current in￿ ation?￿The baseline for comparison is of considerable importance for how in￿ ation responds to
monetary policy and for how useful slack is, in practice, for in￿ ation forecasting. The following is a quick
rundown on some of the more important in￿ ation models:
The NAIRU Model (a.k.a. the Accelerationist Phillips Curve)
In NAIRU (non-accelerating in￿ ation rate of unemployment) in￿ ation models, current in￿ ation is com-
pared with lagged in￿ ation: High slack means one should expect falling in￿ ation, absent (mostly transitory)
cost-push shocks (Friedman 1968). NAIRU models once dominated both the theoretical and the empirical
in￿ ation literatures, and NAIRU thinking continues to in￿ uence policy discussions today. A key implication
of the model is that changes in the expected future conduct of monetary policy have no current e⁄ects on
in￿ ation except insofar as they impact current slack. A corollary is that if you want to bring in￿ ation down,
you must be willing to put up with high unemployment for a time. NAIRU models appear to perform pretty
well, empirically, but that may be partly because measures of slack are revised, ex post, to ￿t the model.
Considerable e⁄ort is devoted to inferring movements in the NAIRU from the observed behavior of in￿ ation.














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
the (to many, unrealistic) implication that the Fed can keep the unemployment rate low for however long it
is willing to tolerate rising in￿ ation.
New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (a.k.a. the Calvo Pricing Model)
In New-Keynesian in￿ ation models, the baseline is expected future in￿ ation rather than lagged in￿ ation.
The New-Keynesian Phillips Curve is now the dominant theoretical model. New-Keynesian ￿rms adjust their
prices the Dos Equis￿way: ￿I don￿ t always change my price, but when I do, I change it with an eye toward
the future conduct of monetary policy￿(Calvo 1983). The result is that in￿ ation is a ￿jumping variable￿ :
Changes in the expected future conduct of policy have immediate e⁄ects on in￿ ation. According to some,
the predicted e⁄ects are so large as to be di¢ cult to reconcile with the data (Fuhrer and Moore 1995).
Because the in￿ ation impact of policy changes is front loaded, New-Keynesian models say that one ought
to expect in￿ ation to rise over time when the unemployment rate is high.
Hybrid (NAIRU and New-Keynesian) Phillips Curve
The baseline for the hybrid model is a (typically 50￿ 50) weighted average of lagged actual and expected
future in￿ ation rates (Gali and Gertler 1999). The hybrid model is more appealing than the plain-vanilla
NAIRU model because in￿ ation is at least somewhat forward looking, and does better empirically than
the plain-vanilla New Keynesian model because the presence of lagged in￿ ation in the baseline gives the
in￿ ation process some inertia. Attempts to justify the hybrid model involve some hand waving and talk of
￿rule-of-thumb￿price setters. It is the dominant empirical model these days. A variant compares current
in￿ ation with a weighted average of expected future in￿ ation and some measure of trend in￿ ation (rather
than lagged in￿ ation).
P-Bar In￿ ation Model
In Bennett McCallum￿ s P-bar model, the baseline against which in￿ ation is compared is the ￿ exible-price
or market-clearing in￿ ation rate￿ that is, the in￿ ation rate you￿ d see in an otherwise identical economy with-
out price rigidities (McCallum 1994). Roughly, the trend in in￿ ation is determined by long-term prospective
growth in the money supply relative to long-term prospective growth in potential output, while deviations
around that trend are determined by slack. We are not aware that this approach has ever been subject to
careful empirical evaluation (probably because the market-clearing in￿ ation rate is not directly observable).
Fischerian or Sticky-Information Phillips Curve
Under this framework, price changes, per se, are costless and continuous. It￿ s re-optimizing planned
price paths that￿ s subject to frictions (Koenig 1996 and Mankiw and Reis 2002). Here, the in￿ ation baseline
depends on the time horizon. Near-term in￿ ation forecasts are tied to lagged expectations of current
in￿ ation (which, in practice, usually means they are tied to lagged trend in￿ ation). At longer horizons,
though, predicted in￿ ation is tied to today￿ s expectation of future market-clearing in￿ ation, much as in the
P-bar model. So, the response of near-term in￿ ation forecasts to a shock is primarily in￿ uenced by slack,
but the longer-horizon predicted response is directly in￿ uenced by policy expectations. Intuitively, in￿ ation
becomes more and more sensitive to changes in anticipated policy as new information about future policy
di⁄uses to a larger and larger fraction of ￿rms. This alternative to the hybrid Phillips curve has not received
a great deal of attention￿ probably because empirical implementation is even more complicated than for
the P-bar model.
Atkeson and Ohanian
Atkeson and Ohanian didn￿ t put forward a theory of in￿ ation, but in an in￿ uential and controversial
article, they pointed out that during the Great Moderation period it has, in practice, proven to be very
di¢ cult to predict in￿ ation changes using measures of slack (Atkeson and Ohanian 2001). Since Atkeson
and Ohanian published their ￿ndings, a key question when evaluating any in￿ ation forecasting model is
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2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT SLACK HELPS EXPLAIN INFLATION?
As noted above, in￿ ation models typically assume that deviations of in￿ ation from some baseline are
related to slack, but di⁄erent models use di⁄erent baselines. Is there evidence that slack is, in fact, important
for understanding in￿ ation? We look at whether deviations of in￿ ation from lagged in￿ ation are explained by
slack and at whether deviations of in￿ ation from long-run trend in￿ ation are explained by slack. Both GDP
and trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation measures are considered. (For precise de￿nitions of the variables used in
this paper, see Table 1.) These series have broad coverage yet are less a⁄ected by transitory cost-push shocks
than headline CPI or headline PCE in￿ ation.1 We use the unemployment rate to measure slack. Unlike
the output gap, the unemployment rate is directly observed and is not subject to revision.2 The analysis
is entirely ￿in sample,￿using latest-available in￿ ation data. (A later out-of-sample forecasting exercise uses
real-time in￿ ation data to the extent possible.) The sample covers the Great Moderation period over which
in￿ ation is di¢ cult to predict.
Table 1: Variable De￿nitions
Variable De￿nition
GDP in￿ ation 100*( Pt
Pt￿4 ￿ 1),
where P is the GDP chain-type price index
PCE in￿ ation 100*( Pt
Pt￿4 ￿ 1),
where P is the PCE chain-type price index
Trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation Quarterly average of trimmed mean PCE 12-month
in￿ ation rate
Unemployment rate Quarterly average of civilian unemployment rate
9-year, 1-year-forward expected CPI 10￿cpi10y￿cpi1y
9 ,
where cpi10y and cpi1y are 10-year and 1-year
CPI in￿ ation expectations from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters
Changes in In￿ ation
In NAIRU models, slack impacts changes in the in￿ ation rate. Accordingly, we estimated equations of
the form:
￿t ￿ ￿t￿4 = ￿(ut￿4 ￿ NAIRU) + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ ut￿5) (A)
where ￿ is the (end-of-sample-vintage estimate of the) in￿ ation measure of interest and u is the unemploy-
ment rate. Results are displayed in Table 2. The lesson from Table 2 is that changes in GDP in￿ ation are
not well explained by the rate of unemployment. Instead, changes in the unemployment rate appear to be
helpful for understanding movements in GDP in￿ ation. For trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation, the level and
the change in the unemployment rate both matter. Each 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate lowers subsequent GDP in￿ ation by about 0.8 percentage points and subsequent trimmed mean PCE
in￿ ation by about 0.7 percentage points. In addition, for each percentage point that unemployment exceeds
the NAIRU, subsequent trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation falls by 11 basis points. In 2010, GDP in￿ ation rose
from its recessionary lows while trimmed mean PCE continued to drift down. This behavior is consistent
1Trimmed mean PCE in￿ation strips out the prices of those items that increased or decreased the most in each month.
The percent trimmed is calibrated to best capture the medium-term trend in in￿ation (Dolmas 2005). Trimmed mean PCE
in￿ation is published each month by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
2Changes in demographics, unemployment insurance and other factors potentially a⁄ect the equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment. We will ignore such variation. Consequently, our empirical results may understate the strength of the connections














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
with the results in Table 2, as the level of slack held down trimmed mean in￿ ation and the change in slack
boosted GDP in￿ ation.
The NAIRU implied by equation A using trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation is 4.9 percent, with a standard
error of 0.5 percentage points. The GDP in￿ ation equation does not yield a useful NAIRU estimate.
Figures 1 and 2 show simple scatter plots of the unemployment rate lagged four quarters with four-
quarter changes in GDP in￿ ation and trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation, respectively. The correlations are
￿ 0.04 and ￿ 0.41 from ￿rst quarter 1984 to ￿rst quarter 2011. (The correlations strengthen to ￿ 0.35 and
￿ 0.65 when the unemployment series is not lagged.) It is striking how little information is conveyed by
the unemployment rate on whether in￿ ation is likely to rise or to fall over the next four quarters. It is
not uncommon for in￿ ation to rise when the unemployment rate exceeds 8 percent or to fall when the
unemployment rate is below 4.5 percent.
Deviations of In￿ ation from Trend
In P-bar and Fischerian (sticky-information) models, slack impacts in￿ ation by temporarily pushing it
away from its long-run trend. Equation B relates deviations of in￿ ation from trend to slack and lagged
deviations of in￿ ation from trend:
￿t ￿ ￿LF
t = ￿(￿t￿4 ￿ ￿LF
t￿4) + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ NR). (B)
Here, NR is the equilibrium or ￿natural￿rate of unemployment and ￿LF is the long-run trend measured
using the nine-year, one-year-forward in￿ ation expectation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF). This expected in￿ ation measure is not published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, but
calculated from the ten-year and one-year CPI in￿ ation forecasts. It is the in￿ ation rate expected over
the nine years starting one year from the present.3 It is meant to capture what the public perceives to
be policymakers￿long-term in￿ ation goal, after short-term in￿ uences wash out. The long-forward expected
in￿ ation measure is for CPI in￿ ation, and CPI in￿ ation tends to run above GDP in￿ ation and trimmed mean
PCE in￿ ation. To prevent these di⁄erences from biasing natural-rate estimates, the sample average of the
di⁄erence between CPI in￿ ation and the in￿ ation measure of interest is subtracted from long-forward CPI
in￿ ation expectations when calculating ￿LF. Speci￿cally, ￿LF equals long-forward CPI expected in￿ ation
less 0.5 percentage points when ￿ is GDP in￿ ation and equals long-forward CPI expected in￿ ation less 0.3
percentage points when ￿ is trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation.
According to Table 3, slack is useful for explaining subsequent deviations of GDP in￿ ation and trimmed
mean PCE in￿ ation from their long-run trends. In￿ ation tends to be low relative to long-forward expected
in￿ ation when the unemployment rate is high and to be high relative to long-forward expected in￿ ation when
the unemployment rate is low. (For both measures of in￿ ation, the change in unemployment is insigni￿cant
when included in the regression.) The implied natural rates, 5.10 and 5.16, are close to the NAIRU implied
by Equation A. For each 1 percentage point that unemployment exceeds the natural rate, GDP in￿ ation
runs 0.14 percentage points below trend in the short run (over the following four quarters) and runs 0.28
percentage points below trend in the long run. For each 1 percentage point that unemployment exceeds its
natural rate, trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation subsequently runs 0.27 percentage points below trend.
3Until 1992, the ten-year CPI in￿ation forecasts were only collected in the ￿rst and fourth quarter. The second and
third quarter nine-year, one-year-forward expectations up until 1992 are estimated with a regression on the three-year, seven-
year-forward Treasury yield: cpi9y1yfwdt = 0:22 + 0:13 ￿ r3y7yfwdt + 0:88 ￿ (cpi9y1yfwdt￿1 ￿ 0:13 ￿ r3y7yfwdt￿1) where
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Table 2: Are Changes in In￿ ation Related to Slack?
￿t￿￿t￿4 = ￿(ut￿4 ￿NAIRU) + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ut￿5 )
Sample: 1984:Q1￿ 2011:Q1
In￿ ation Measure ￿ ￿ NAIRU Adj. R2/S.E.
GDP in￿ ation ￿ 0.0194 ￿ 0.8618 ￿ 0.008
(0.0686) (18.6362) 0.683
GDP in￿ ation ￿ 0.0158 ￿ 0.7917** ￿ 0.7642 0.116
(0.0855) (0.2765) (35.6360) 0.639
GDP in￿ ation ￿ ￿ 0.7831* ￿ 0.107
(0.3152) 0.643
Comments: It is not the level but the change in the unemployment rate that is
helpful for predicting changes in GDP in￿ ation. A 1-percentage point increase
in the unemployment rate reduces the forecasted change in GDP in￿ ation by 0.8
percentage points.
Trimmed mean ￿ 0.1108** ￿ 4.9826** 0.160
PCE in￿ ation (0.0336) (0.5903) 0.361
Trimmed mean ￿ 0.1076** ￿ 0.7043** 4.8923** 0.468
PCE in￿ ation (0.0221) (0.0831) (0.5010) 0.287
Comments: Both the level and the change in the unemployment rate are helpful for
predicting changes in trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation. For each 1 percentage point
that unemployment exceeds the NAIRU, forecasted in￿ ation falls by 0.1 percentage
points. Also, each 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate reduces
the forecasted change in in￿ ation by 0.7 percentage points.
Standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients, in parentheses, are Newey-West corrected.
* Signi￿cant at 5-percent level.














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Table 3: Are Deviations of In￿ ation from Trend Related to Slack?
￿t￿￿LF
t = ￿(￿t￿4 ￿￿LF
t￿4) + ￿(ut￿4￿NR)
Sample: 1984:Q1￿ 2011:Q1
In￿ ation Measure ￿ ￿ NR Adj. R2/S.E.
GDP in￿ ation ￿ ￿ 0.2811** 5.0990** 0.264
(0.0648) (0.5739) 0.674
GDP in￿ ation 0.5058** ￿ 0.1375* 5.1040** 0.448
(0.1545) (0.0647) (0.8229) 0.584
Comments: The estimates indicate that deviations in in￿ ation from long-run trend
in￿ ation are systematically related to the unemployment rate. For each 1 percentage
point that unemployment exceeds its natural rate, in￿ ation runs 0.14 percentage
points below trend in the short run and hypothetically runs 0.28 percentage points
below trend in the long run. The change in the unemployment rate is insigni￿cant
when included in the regression.
Trimmed mean ￿ ￿ 0.2657** 5.0710** 0.566
PCE in￿ ation (0.0333) (0.3049) 0.340
Trimmed mean 0.2652 ￿ 0.2187** 5.1603** 0.608
PCE in￿ ation (0.1340) (0.0341) (0.3023) 0.322
Comments: Here, again, deviations in in￿ ation from long-run trend in￿ ation are
systematically related to the unemployment rate. For each 1 percentage point that
unemployment exceeds its natural rate, in￿ ation runs 0.27 percentage points below
trend. The change in the unemployment rate is insigni￿cant when included in the
regression.
Standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients, in parentheses, are Newey-West corrected.
* Signi￿cant at 5-percent level.
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Figures 3 and 4 show the connection between the four-quarter lagged level of the unemployment rate and
deviations of GDP in￿ ation and trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation, respectively, from SPF long-forward in￿ ation
expectations (corrected for sample-average di⁄erences with CPI in￿ ation). Slack has a tighter relationship
with trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation than GDP in￿ ation, but both have a clear, negative relationship. (The
correlations in the two charts are ￿ 0.52 and ￿ 0.75.) Notably, an unemployment rate above 6.1 percent
virtually guarantees that in￿ ation will fall short of trend over the coming year.
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SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics.





Trimmed mean PCE inflation





3456789 1 0 1 1
Unemployment rate, lagged 4Q
Percent















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   






4-quarter rate  1984:Q1−2011:Q1
-2
-1
3456789 1 0 1 1
Unemployment rate, lagged 4Q
Percent
*GDP inflation − SPF 9-year, 1-year-forward CPI inflation expectations + 0.5.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Natural rate = 5.10






4-quarter rate  1984:Q1−2011:Q1
-2
-1
3456789 1 0 1 1
Unemployment rate, lagged 4Q
Percent
*Trimmed mean PCE inflation − SPF 9-year, 1-year-forward CPI inflation expectations + 0.3.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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3. IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT SLACK HELPS FORECAST INFLATION?
An in-sample statistical relationship between in￿ ation and slack as these variables appear today does
not necessarily mean that slack helps to forecast in￿ ation in real time, for three reasons. First, slack￿ s
in￿ uence may be statistically signi￿cant but practically unimportant. Second, relationships estimated using
today￿ s data can be very di⁄erent from those estimated using data that would have been available at the
time￿ which are the relationships that matter for real-time forecasting. Third, the links between slack
and in￿ ation may be unstable over time. To determine whether or not slack is likely to be of practical
help in predicting in￿ ation, we estimate two di⁄erent Phillips-curve-style forecasting equations recursively,
using only information that would have been available at the time, and we compare the resultant real-time
in￿ ation predictions to simple rule-of-thumb alternatives, in the spirit of Atkeson and Ohanian (2001).
Results con￿rm that slack and changes in slack are useful for predicting trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation
measured either as a deviation from lagged trimmed mean in￿ ation or as a deviation from the public￿ s long-
forward in￿ ation expectations. Interestingly, there￿ s no need to develop or estimate separate forecasting
equations for GDP in￿ ation or headline PCE in￿ ation: The best forecasts of these in￿ ation measures come
from the trimmed mean PCE forecast equation. Since slack and changes in slack help predict trimmed mean
in￿ ation, they are indirectly also helpful for predicting headline in￿ ation. The Phillips-curve speci￿cation
that measures trimmed mean in￿ ation as a deviation from long-forward in￿ ation expectations performs
particularly well, suggesting that current in￿ ation adjusts quickly and one-for-one with changes in the
public￿ s perception of the Fed￿ s long-run in￿ ation objective. From 1998 onward, this perceived objective
has been ￿rmly anchored at 2.5 percent, as measured by CPI in￿ ation.
Background
We look at the real-time performance of two di⁄erent in￿ ation forecasting equations for each of three
di⁄erent measures of in￿ ation over the past ten years. The three in￿ ation measures are GDP in￿ ation,
headline PCE in￿ ation, and trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation. GDP and headline PCE in￿ ation are both of
direct interest to policymakers. (The original Taylor rule is based on GDP in￿ ation. The Federal Open
Market Committee has decided to de￿ne long-term price stability in terms of headline PCE in￿ ation.)
Even though it may not be of direct policy interest, the fact that trimmed mean in￿ ation strips high-
frequency noise out of headline in￿ ation makes it potentially useful as an indicator of headline trends and
as a forecasting tool. Every e⁄ort is made here to restrict the information used for forecasting to that which
would have been available in real time. For example, slack is measured using un￿ltered unemployment-rate
data: We do not try to construct or obtain real-time, time-varying NAIRU or natural rate estimates.4 Any
lagged in￿ ation rates that appear on the right-hand side of a forecasting equation are second-release estimates
whenever possible. (Unfortunately, real-time estimates of trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation don￿ t begin until
2005.) Left-hand-side in￿ ation rates are always the latest vintage that would have been available at the
time of the estimation. Each sample begins in ￿rst quarter 1984￿ the beginning of the Great Moderation
period. The ￿rst sample ends in ￿rst quarter 2000, and the estimated equation is used to forecast in￿ ation
over the four quarters ending ￿rst quarter 2001. The sample is then extended by one quarter, coe¢ cients
are updated, and a new forecast prepared. The ￿nal in￿ ation observation covers the four quarters ending
￿rst quarter 2011.
Forecasting Equation #1
In our ￿rst forecasting equation, the baseline with which in￿ ation is compared is a weighted average of
lagged in￿ ation, lagged SPF long-forward in￿ ation expectations, and lagged trend in￿ ation as captured by
the trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation rate:
￿t = ￿ + ￿1￿RT
t￿4 + ￿2￿LF
t￿4 + ￿3￿TM
t￿4 + ￿ut￿4 + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ ut￿5), (1)
where ￿ is the (end-of-sample-vintage estimate of the) in￿ ation measure of interest, ￿RT is the second-release
￿real-time￿estimate of the in￿ ation measure of interest, ￿LF is nine-year, one-year ￿long-forward￿expected
CPI in￿ ation from the SPF, ￿TM is the second-release estimate of ￿trimmed mean￿PCE in￿ ation, and u
is the unemployment rate. The beta coe¢ cients are constrained to sum to 1. For trimmed mean in￿ ation,
￿RT and ￿TM are exactly the same thing, so we set ￿1 = 0. For all three in￿ ation measures, the hypothesis
that ￿1 = ￿2 = 0 cannot be rejected at standard signi￿cance levels. So, in practice, Equation 1 reduces to:
￿t ￿ ￿TM
t￿4 = ￿ + ￿ut￿4 + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ ut￿5). (10)
4We looked at the Stock-Watson ￿unemployment recession gap￿ measure of slack but did not ￿nd it to be useful. See














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
The deviation of in￿ ation from lagged trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation depends on the lagged unemployment
rate and the lagged change in the unemployment rate. Equation 10 is a NAIRU-style model: Changes in the
expected future conduct of monetary policy have no impact on in￿ ation except through the unemployment
rate.
Estimates of Equation 10 are presented in Table 4A for each of three measures of in￿ ation over each
of two sample periods. Results for trimmed mean in￿ ation are clear cut. They show that trimmed mean
in￿ ation is lower by 0.1 percentage points for each percentage point that the unemployment rate exceeds its
mean and is lower by approximately 0.8 percentage points for each percentage point that the unemployment
rate increases. GDP-in￿ ation and headline-PCE-in￿ ation responses are quite similar, but estimated less
precisely. Still, the hypothesis that the equations all have the same coe¢ cients is rejected.
Forecasting Equation #2
Our second forecasting equation is in the spirit of the P-bar in￿ ation model or the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve, in that it builds in the potential for forward-looking price-setting behavior. Here, the baseline
against which current in￿ ation is compared is current long-forward in￿ ation expectations. In its most general
form:
￿t ￿ ￿LF




t￿4) + ￿ut￿4 + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ ut￿5), (2)
where all variables are de￿ned as in Equation 1, but coe¢ cients may take on di⁄erent values. In particular,
the beta coe¢ cients are not constrained to sum to 1.
For trimmed mean in￿ ation, ￿RT and ￿TM are exactly the same, so we set ￿1 = 0. For the other
in￿ ation measures, the hypothesis that ￿1 = 0 cannot be rejected at standard signi￿cance levels. So, in
practice, Equation 2 reduces to:
￿t ￿ ￿LF
t = ￿ + ￿(￿TM
t￿4 ￿ ￿LF
t￿4) + ￿ut￿4 + ￿(ut￿4 ￿ ut￿5). (20)
The deviation of in￿ ation from long-forward expected in￿ ation depends on the lagged deviation of trimmed
mean in￿ ation from long-forward in￿ ation expectations, the unemployment rate, and the lagged change in
the unemployment rate. Note that according to Equation 20 any change in the FOMC￿ s perceived in￿ation
objective has an immediate one-for-one impact on current in￿ation, independent of the amount of slack.
Estimates of Equation 20 are presented in Table 4B for each of three measures of in￿ ation, over the same
samples as in Table 4A. The results show that trimmed mean in￿ ation is lower by about 0.2 percentage points
for each percentage point that the unemployment rate exceeds its mean, and is lower by approximately 0.4
percentage points for each percentage point that the unemployment rate increases. GDP in￿ ation results
are very similar, and coe¢ cient estimates are about equally precise. Precision su⁄ers in the headline PCE
equation, but coe¢ cient estimates are in the same ballpark. Again, though, the hypothesis that the equations













































s              
                   
                   
                         
                       
               
                       
                     
               
                       
                         
                 
                         
                         
                   
                     
                   
                           
       
               
                       
                           
                 
                       
                   
                 
               
                     
                     
                       
                         
                             
                     
                 
                     
                           
                               
                             
                         
                         
                           
                 
Table 4A: Real-Time In￿ ation Forecasting Equations: Equation 10
￿t￿￿TM
t￿4 = ￿ + ￿ut￿4 +￿(ut￿4 ￿ut￿5 )
In￿ ation Measure ￿ ￿ ￿ Adj. R2/S.E.
1984:Q1￿ 2000:Q1
Trimmed mean 0.411 ￿ 0.097** ￿ 0.822** 0.318
PCE in￿ ation (0.230) (0.037) (0.196) 0.287
GDP in￿ ation 0.039 ￿ 0.082 ￿ 0.745** 0.165
(0.352) (0.055) (0.186) 0.378
PCE in￿ ation 0.401 ￿ 0.092 ￿ 0.388 0.015
(0.586) (0.085) (0.290) 0.596
1984:Q1￿ 2011:Q1
Trimmed mean 0.627** ￿ 0.110** ￿ 0.795** 0.480
PCE in￿ ation (0.159) (0.024) (0.098) 0.304
GDP in￿ ation 0.502 ￿ 0.124 ￿ 1.097** 0.243
(0.426) (0.066) (0.228) 0.663
PCE in￿ ation 0.263 ￿ 0.062 ￿ 0.811* 0.080
(0.517) (0.076) (0.348) 0.823
Standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients, in parentheses, are Newey-West corrected.
* Signi￿cant at 5-percent level.














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Table 4B: Real-Time In￿ ation Forecasting Equations: Equation 20
￿t￿￿LF
t = ￿ + ￿(￿TM
t￿4 ￿￿LF
t￿4) + ￿ut￿4 +￿(ut￿4 ￿ut￿5)
In￿ ation Measure ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Adj. R2/S.E.
1984:Q1￿ 2000:Q1
Trimmed mean 0.687 0.401* ￿ 0.184** ￿ 0.381* 0.503
PCE in￿ ation (0.359) (0.189) (0.061) (0.178) 0.325
GDP in￿ ation 0.303 0.548* ￿ 0.150* ￿ 0.441* 0.435
(0.384) (0.217) (0.057) (0.186) 0.387
PCE in￿ ation 0.639 0.882** ￿ 0.118 ￿ 0.396 0.388
(0.591) (0.294) (0.091) (0.310) 0.566
1984:Q1￿ 2011:Q1
Trimmed mean 0.866** 0.403* ￿ 0.194** ￿ 0.402** 0.622
PCE in￿ ation (0.231) (0.168) (0.046) (0.152) 0.316
GDP in￿ ation 0.648 0.604* ￿ 0.172* ￿ 0.871** 0.336
(0.447) (0.231) (0.079) (0.284) 0.641
PCE in￿ ation 0.384 0.659* ￿ 0.100 ￿ 0.630 0.169
(0.512) (0.292) (0.084) (0.379) 0.800
Standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients, in parentheses, are Newey-West corrected.
* Signi￿cant at 5-percent level.
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Public Perceptions of the Fed￿ s In￿ ation Goal
Equation 20 produces an in￿ ation forecast that is conditioned on long-forward in￿ ation expectations￿
that is, the forecast is conditioned on the perceived long-term-in￿ ation policy objective. How do these
perceptions evolve? In the empirical in￿ ation literature it has been common to assume that the FOMC￿ s
in￿ ation objective follows a random walk and that public perceptions of this objective follow a persistent
process that is sensitive to realized past in￿ ation. The idea is that the credibility of any announced objective
is gradually eroded if in￿ ation stays too high (or too low) for too long. (Take this line of reasoning very far
and you travel full circle and end up back at the NAIRU model.) Fuhrer and Olivei (2010), for example,
assume that the Fed￿ s perceived in￿ ation goal evolves according to
￿LF
t = ￿￿LF
t￿4 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AV G
t￿4 + noise,
where ￿AV G is an average of recent realized in￿ ation rates. We estimated a somewhat more general equation,
with lagged trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation taking the place of ￿AV G
t￿4 :
￿LF
t = ￿0 + ￿1￿LF
t￿4 + ￿2￿TM
t￿4 + noise. (3)
A standard (Quandt-Andrews) stability test identi￿es a clear break in this relationship at the end of 1997.







t￿4 + noise S.E. = 0:336.




+ noise S.E. = 0:075. (30)
The ￿noise￿term in Equation 30 is uncorrelated with in￿ ation and unemployment information available
at t ￿ 4. The implication is that the best four-quarter-ahead forecast of SPF long-forward CPI in￿ ation
expectations is a constant: 2.5 percent. From 1998 on, long-term in￿ ation expectations have been extremely
￿well anchored.￿Figure 5 shows a plot of the SPF long-forward in￿ ation expectation, with a vertical line
marking the late-1990s regime shift. Toward the end of the sample, the chart also shows the ￿ve-year,
￿ve-year-forward in￿ ation expectations implied by TIPS yields. The TIPS-implied rate is higher frequency
and more volatile, with a shorter sample. The two series match up well, outside of the Lehman-collapse
aftermath.
When using Equation 20 to forecast in￿ ation, we condition on ￿LF
t = 2:5, consistent with Equation 30.
The analyst who believes that in￿ ation expectations are becoming unanchored should adjust these in￿ ation
forecasts accordingly. For example, the analyst who believes that SPF long-forward in￿ ation expectations
will drift upward to 2.75 percent between now and third quarter 2012, should add 25 basis points to the
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SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; Federal Reserve Board; authors’ calculations.
Results
Tables 5A, B, and C report root-mean-square forecast errors (RMSEs) achieved by Equations 10 and 20
for trimmed mean PCE, GDP, and headline PCE in￿ ation, respectively. The smaller the RMSE, the better
the forecast performance. In addition, the tables report how well one would have done by simply using lagged
in￿ ation to predict future in￿ ation, by simply using lagged trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation to predict future
in￿ ation, and by simply using lagged long-forward SPF in￿ ation expectations to predict future in￿ ation.5
These ￿rule-of-thumb￿forecasts ignore slack, very much in the spirit of Atkeson and Ohanian. Finally, the
tables report how one would have done by setting forecasted GDP in￿ ation and forecasted headline PCE
in￿ ation equal to forecasted trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation, where forecasts of trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation
come either from Equation 10 or Equation 20. Trimming strips unforecastable noise from headline in￿ ation.
As a result, trimmed mean in￿ ation is relatively easy to predict, and forecasting-equation coe¢ cients are
more precisely estimated. Perhaps a trimmed mean in￿ ation forecast can do double or triple duty, by also
usefully serving as a forecast of GDP or headline PCE in￿ ation.
In each row of the tables, the best-performing forecasts are identi￿ed by asterisks, and the RMSE of
the worst-performing forecast is put in parentheses. Forecasting performance is assessed for the periods
￿rst quarter 2006 to ￿rst quarter 2011 and ￿rst quarter 2001 to ￿rst quarter 2011 because real-time vintage
trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation data are not available until 2005. The forecasts for ￿rst quarter 2006 to ￿rst
quarter 2011 are as they would have appeared at the time.
The message from Table 5A is that unemployment and changes in unemployment are useful for predicting
trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation. In particular, Equation 20 produces lower RMSEs than all other forecasting
methods considered. Equation 10 comes in second. Figure 6 compares the forecasts from Equations 10 and
20 with actual trimmed mean in￿ ation. The forecasts did remarkably well in predicting the steady decline in
in￿ ation after 2007. From 2003 to 2006, the forecasts were consistently below realized in￿ ation as currently
estimated. (The gap is mostly due to upward revisions to early estimates of trimmed mean in￿ ation.)
Table 5B shows that the forecasts of trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation from Equation 20 are also the best
forecasts of GDP in￿ ation. The trimmed mean forecasts consistently do a better job of predicting GDP
in￿ ation than either Equation 10 or Equation 20 applied directly to GDP in￿ ation and also do a better
job than the rule-of-thumb forecasts that simply extrapolate from lagged in￿ ation. Figure 7 compares the
50.3 percentage points are subtracted from the SPF long-forward in￿ation expectations in Table 5A and C, approximating
the usual di⁄erential between CPI in￿ation and trimmed mean PCE in￿ation. In Table 5B, 0.5 percentage points are subtracted
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trimmed mean forecasts from Equation 20 with actual GDP in￿ ation and with SPF GDP-in￿ ation forecasts.6
Again, the forecasts were consistently low from 2003 to 2006 but capture the recessionary drop fairly well.
According to Table 5C, SPF long-forward in￿ ation expectations and forecasts of trimmed mean PCE
in￿ ation from Equation 20 perform about equally well as forecasts of headline PCE in￿ ation over 2001￿ 11,
and generally dominate alternative forecasts. The clear loser in the forecasting horse race is lagged headline
PCE in￿ ation: There is simply a great deal of variation in headline in￿ ation that is uninformative for future
headline in￿ ation. Much of this variation is unrelated to long-forward in￿ ation expectations and to the level
or change in slack, too. Thus, even our best headline-PCE forecasts have root-mean-square errors in excess
of 100 basis points over 2001￿ 11, as compared with about 80 basis points for GDP in￿ ation and about 30
basis points for trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation. The di¢ culty of forecasting headline PCE in￿ ation over the
past 10 years is quite evident in Figure 8.
Table 5: Root-Mean-Square Errors of Alternative Real-Time Forecasts
A. Trimmed Mean PCE In￿ ation Forecasts
Trim Mean Forecast Lagged In￿ ation Measures
Interval Eq. 10 Eq. 20 Trim Mean Long-Fwd
￿ 06-￿ 11 0.324* 0.323** 0.577 (0.714)
￿ 01-￿ 11 0.375* 0.327** 0.512 (0.543)
B. GDP In￿ ation Forecasts
GDP Forecast Lagged In￿ ation Measures Trim Mean Forecast
Interval Eq. 10 Eq. 20 GDP Long-Fwd Trim Mean Eq. 10 Eq. 20
￿ 06-￿ 11 0.904 0.881 0.926 1.036 (1.092) 0.783* 0.781**
￿ 01-￿ 11 1.017 0.967 0.961 0.909 (1.022) 0.862* 0.823**
C. Headline PCE In￿ ation Forecasts
PCE Forecast Lagged In￿ ation Measures Trim Mean Forecast
Interval Eq. 10 Eq. 20 PCE Long-Fwd Trim Mean Eq. 10 Eq. 20
￿ 06-￿ 11 1.340 1.303 (1.950) 1.307 1.338 1.271* 1.229**





6The SPF survey and the trimmed mean PCE in￿ation forecasts from Equation 20 are in a virtual dead heat when it














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   







Actual trimmed mean PCE inflation, current vintage
Equation 2' out-of-sample forecast
Fitted values
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NOTE: Gray bars represent recession.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; authors’ calculations.







Actual GDP inflation, current vintage
Trimmed mean PCE Eq. 2' out-of-sample forecast
Fitted values
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NOTE: Gray bars represent recession.
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6 Actual headline PCE inflation, current vintage
Trimmed mean PCE Eq. 2' out-of-sample forecast
Fitted values
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NOTE: Gray bars represent recession.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; authors’ calculations.
4. CONCLUSION
There￿ s no need for multiple in￿ ation forecasting equations. It is enough to forecast trimmed mean
PCE in￿ ation because forecasts of trimmed mean in￿ ation are also superior forecasts of GDP in￿ ation and
headline PCE in￿ ation. When forecasting trimmed mean in￿ ation, slack matters. For each percentage point
that the unemployment rate exceeds its average, trimmed mean in￿ ation can be expected to come in 0.2
percentage points below its long-run trend. Changes in slack matter, too. Trimmed mean in￿ ation can be
expected to come in 0.1 percentage points below trend for each quarter-point increase in the unemployment
rate. Historically, changes in public perceptions of the Fed￿ s long-run in￿ ation objective have also had a
strong in￿ uence on trimmed mean in￿ ation. However, since the late 1990s, movements in these perceptions
have been small and transitory￿ hence unimportant for forecasting. Our analysis suggests that trimmed
mean PCE in￿ ation, GDP in￿ ation, and headline PCE in￿ ation will all come in at a bit under 1.5 percent
over the four quarters from third quarter 2011 to third quarter 2012. Con￿dence bands are wide￿ especially
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